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Kemp v. Bumble Bee (Cont.) 
concluded that these clauses clearly and unequivocally com­
municated that the risk of unseaworthiness would fall on Kemp 
once it accepted the vessel. Bumble Bee effectively waived all 
warranties. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that Kemp and Bumble 
Bee are corporations familiar with business transactions. 
Kemp's attorney received the charter with Bumble Bee in the 
month before signing, and changes were incorporated into the 
final charter. These factors persuaded the court to hold that 
"nothing suggested that the agreement was not recognized by 
both parties as final and complete." 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment; 
Bumble Bee is not liable for Kemp's losses. 
Laura Dilimetin '90 
FMC CORPORATION v. MAJORIE LYKES AND LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 30 June 1988 
851 F.2d 78 
To determine the "customary freight unit" within the meaning of limitation of liability with respect to the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act, the courts should examine the bill of lading and the filed tariff which expresses the contractual 
relationships of the parties. 
FACTS: In October 1982, the FMC Corporation <FMCl shipped 
30 small fire engines from Pennsylvania to Egypt on the SS 
Majorie Lykes under an agreement with the Lykes Brothers 
Steamship Company <Lykes). The carrier charged the shipper 
on a lump sum basis, and a description of the goods recited on 
the bill of lading was "30 Unboxed-Fire Engines". The same bill 
reflected a lump sum charge of"$4250/ea. x 30". There was no 
mention of value of the goods within the bill of lading. As the fire 
engines were being unloaded, Lykes dropped one engine onto 
two others destroying all three. FMC replaced the three fire 
engines at a total cbst of $165,254 and commenced an action in 
the district court seeking damages under the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act <COGSAl. 
After a bench trial, the district court found Lykes liable for 
the damage, recognizing that in the absence of declaration of 
value of goods in the bill of lading, COGSA limits the carriers 
liability to $500 per customary freight unit. 
The district court, seeking to determine what unit the parties 
actually used to compute the freight charged for the shipment, 
looked first to the bill of lading and the filed tariff. Both documents 
recited a lump sum rate, $4250 for each of the 30 fire engines. 
However, in attempting to discern the intent of the parties, the 
district court looked beyond these two documents and also con­
sidered the parties negotiations. 
Prior to arriving at the agreed lump sum shipping rate, the 
parties had negotiated for a rate based on a weight/measurement 
unit of 40 cubic feet. They assumed that each fire engine 
measured 1700 cubic feet, although as it turned out later, the 
actual measurement was 1522.5 cubic feet. Lykes initially of­
fered to ship the freight at $165 for each 40 cubic foot unit and 
later reduced its offer to $125 per unit. Before measuring the fire 
engines to determine the actual number of cubic feet involved, 
the parties agreed to a lump sum rate of $4250 per fire engine. 
FMC contended that this lump sum figure was arrived at by 
multiplying a rate of $100 per weight/measurement unit by 
42.5, the number of 40 cubic foot units in an assumed 1700 cubic 
feet fire engine. Based on the negotiations, the district court 
concluded that the customary freight for this shipment was 40 
cubic feet, that there were 127.5 units in the three damaged fire 
engines, and thus at $500 per unit, that Lykes was liable for 
$63,750. 
ISSUE: Whether in determining a "customary freight unit" 
within the meaning of the limitation of liability provision of 
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COGSA (46 U.S.C. App. §1304 (5)), the court should examine 
prior negotiations as well as the bill of lading and filed tariff? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re­
versed the district courts decision because the bill of lading and 
the filed tariff were conclusive on the question of the customary 
freight unit for this shipment and entered a judgment of $1500 
for the plaintiff. 
The limitation of liability provision of COGSA, 46 U.S.C. App. 
§ 1304 (5) provides that "neither the carrier nor the ship shall in 
any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in 
connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceed­
ing $500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in 
the case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight 
unit, ... " 
FMC could have eliminated the limitation of liability by 
declaring a higher value of the goods in the bill of lading. In this 
case, no value at all was declared in the bill. Since the fire 
engines were not shipped in packages, the carriers liability is 
limited to the $500 per "customary freight unit." The question 
presented, therefore is, what is the "customary freight unit?" 
The cases discussing the meaning of "customary freight unit" 
are inconsistent. While some courts have held that the customary 
freight unit is the measurement "customarily" used to calculate 
the rate to be charged, the Second Circuit has taken a different 
approach. In the Second Circuit the customary freight unit is 
the actual freight unit used by the parties to calculate freight for 
the shipment at issue. Binladen BSB Landscaping v. M. V. Ned­
lloyd Rotterdam, 759 F.2d 1006, 1016 <2d Cir.l cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 229 88 L.Ed 220 < 1985!. 
In this case the description of the goods recited on the bill of 
lading and filed tariff was clear. Where there is no ambiguity in 
either the bill of lading or the tariff, there is no need for the 
district court to consider any of the parties earlier negotiations, 
and in doing so, the district court erred. 
Thus, the intent of the parties as to the customary freight unit 
is the Second Circuit standard, and in determining that intent 
the courts must look to the bill of lading and the tariff. Absent 
any ambiguity there, the inquiry is ended, and both parties are 
bound to the freight unit therein adopted. This rule provides 
certainty and fairness to both sides. The intended freight unit is 
set forth in the bill of lading, and before shipment either party 
could require that a different unit be expressed. 
Glenn T. Henneberger '91 
